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ABSTRACT 
 
Existing judicial research has firmly established the role of the law and the courts 
in the political system of the United States.  Yet very little systematic empirical research 
has been conducted to fully explore the extent to which theories of judicial behavior 
based upon the American judicial system are applicable to other legal systems.  As a 
result, these theories lack generalizability and, moreover, have failed to determine if the 
U.S. judiciary is comparable to other court systems or simply an anomaly within a 
broader comparative framework.   
Given this void within the existing literature, this study extends several theories of 
judicial behavior developed in the American context to South Africa’s highest court, the 
Appellate Division, throughout the time period 1950-1990—roughly the rise and fall of 
apartheid.   Specifically, it employs an integrated approach derived from both the legal 
and extralegal approaches of judicial decision making to a particularly salient issue area, 
the death penalty, and discovers that ideology and race—rather than legal factors—are 
perhaps the strongest predictors of death penalty decisions.  The implications of these 
findings are that judicial decision making is much more complex than what the legal 
model suggests and, concomitantly, that theories of judicial behavior extrapolated from 
the American context are capable of similarly determining the degree to which politics 







    1
INTRODUCTION 
 
Contemporary research in judicial politics has provided great insight into the 
functioning of courts in the United States.  Scholars have seemingly unveiled several of 
the underlying processes that significantly affect judicial decision making, substantially 
contributing to our knowledge of judicial behavior in the framework of such areas as 
agenda setting (Perry 1991), strategic behavior (Murphy 1964; Maltzman and Wahlbeck 
1996; Epstein and Knight 1998), ideological or preference voting (Schubert 1962; Segal 
and Spaeth 1993, 2002) and the like.  Yet these findings have been myopic in scope, 
focusing primarily upon the U.S. courts and consequently neglecting courts within a 
larger comparative context. 
While studies on the American courts have been abundant, systematic empirical 
research on courts outside of the U.S. has been sparse, as few works have attempted to 
determine the role of law and the courts in other political systems.1  With the global 
expansion of the “judicialization of politics” (Tate and Vallinder 1995),2 however, 
scholars have steadily become more responsive to the need of the public law sub-field to 
obtain a more thorough understanding of legal systems via comparative research.  As a 
result, judicial scholars have expanded their research into several countries including 
examinations of the court systems of Spain (Toharia 1975; Giles and Lancaster 1989), the 
Philippines (Haynie 1994, 1995), India (Epp 1998) Argentina (Helmke 2002) and South 
Africa (Haynie 2003), among others. 
                                                 
1 For a similar criticism, see Gibson, Caldeira and Baird (1998). 
2 Tate and Vallinder (1995, 14) refer to the global expansion of judicial power, or the “judicialization of 
politics” as “the infusion of judicial decision-making and of courtlike procedures into political arenas 
where they did not previously reside.”  
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Comparative judicial research is also necessary to establish the generalizability of 
the judicial behavior theories posited by scholars of the American courts.  Is the U.S. 
legal system, on the whole, an anomaly?  Or, conversely, is it similar to other judicial 
systems? These are questions that can only be answered after exporting our theories of 
judicial behavior to other court systems. 
This study seeks to fill part of this void within the existing judicial literature by 
applying judicial decision-making theories developed in the U.S. context to the Appellate 
Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa.  The primary goal is to determine the 
degree to which politics plays a role within the judicial decision-making process of South 
Africa’s highest appellate court of the apartheid era. Specifically, an integrated model of 
decision making derived from both the legal and extralegal approaches to law is extended 
to a single issue area, the death penalty, in order to ascertain whether or not judges do 
indeed rely upon factors in addition to—or perhaps even exclusive of—the law in 
determining case decisions. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Models of Judicial Behavior 
 
One of the most enduring questions posed by scholars of judicial politics concerns 
the basis upon which judges construct their decisions.  Until the early 20th century, legal 
scholars strictly subscribed to the belief that judges embraced a mechanical jurisprudence 
approach to law, relying on stare decisis as the chief determinant in their case decisions.  
The legal model of decision making is thus based upon the notion that judicial decisions 
are solely derived from the framer’s intent, precedent or the “plain meaning” of the 
statute or constitutional text and the facts of the case.  According to 18th century British 
jurist William Blackstone (1765, 69), judges were “living oracles” of the law and adhered 
to precedent so that they were “not liable to waver with every new judge’s opinion.” The 
1920’s, however, began the era of legal realism; scholars began to recognize—or perhaps 
to admit—that judges were influenced by factors other than simply law and precedent 
(Pound 1910, 1922; Cohen 1914; Cardozo 1921; Llewellyn 1931).    
 This innovative belief quickly gave way to the judicial behavioralist movement, 
which spawned a plethora of studies focusing on the role of personal preferences and 
attitudes, as well as other extralegal factors, in the judicial decision-making process.  
Among the first of these works was Pritchett’s (1948) study of the Roosevelt Court, 
whereby he systematically analyzed the patterns of ideological alignment among the 
justices of the Supreme Court.   
Yet it was not until Schubert (1962) that a formal model of judicial decision 
making was introduced into the field.  Using a method of cumulative scaling, his findings 
suggested that judges are influenced by their ideology and that their decisions are driven 
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by these ideological preferences.  Thus, justices vote in the direction of an issue that is 
closest to them in their ideological space. Schubert’s measure of ideology, however, was 
derived from the justices’ votes themselves, a tautological dilemma both theoretically and 
methodologically. Nevertheless, this pivotal piece laid the groundwork for later 
attitudinal models, highlighting the impact of ideology on judicial decision making 
(Gibson 1978; Rohde and Spaeth 1976; Segal and Spaeth 1993). 
Segal and Spaeth (1993; 2002) are most widely credited for their work on the 
attitudinal model and assert that decisions of Supreme Court justices are primarily based 
upon their personal political attitudes and values.  Segal and Spaeth (1993, 73) discount 
the legal model, claiming that it is impossible to both accurately operationalize and 
falsify.  Instead, the attitudinal model contends that justices use their ideologies as a 
guide to sift through the various legal factors presented and utilized in each case. Thus 
the facts and the law are not irrelevant, but are inevitably filtered through the attitudes 
and preferences of the judge. 
In these analyses, the “circularity problem” of measuring ideology is avoided 
through the use of independent measures created by Segal and Cover (1989).3  Now 
considered the standard measure in studies of the U.S. Supreme Court, ideology is 
captured through a content analysis of statements obtained from a number of newspaper 
editorials throughout the nomination and confirmation processes for each Supreme Court 
justice, from Warren to Kennedy. This technique has similarly been used to create 
independent measures of ideology for judges at the state level (Traut and Emmert 1998).  
Still others have used the judges’ appointing president (Tate 1981; Songer and Haire 
                                                 
3 Additional scores were later added by Segal et al. (1995). 
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1992, 1994) and the political environment surrounding the Court (George and Epstein 
1992) as alternative independent measures of judicial ideology.  
Though most scholars would agree that political ideology does play a significant 
role within judicial decisions, many admit that the attitudinal approach fails to paint a 
complete picture of the overall judicial decision-making process and are rather hesitant to 
wholly discount the role of legal factors within this process (e.g., Brenner and Stier 1996; 
Brisbin 1996).  As a result, several scholars have presented more complex models of 
judicial behavior—those that not only include judicial ideology, but various other legal 
and extralegal considerations as well (Songer and Haire 1992; George and Epstein 1992; 
Knight and Epstein 1996; Songer and Lindquist 1996).   
Within these integrated models, case characteristics are commonly used to test 
both legal and extralegal approaches of judicial decision making.  According to Segal 
(1984, 892) the legal model “assumes decisions are based upon ‘standards set in 
constitution, statute, precedent or court rule’.” On the other hand, the extralegal model 
deals “with characteristics of the defendant that are legally irrelevant to the sentencing 
decision.”4  Integrating these two models, Segal (1984; 1986) was one of the first 
scholars to test the effect of case facts in analyses of the U.S. Supreme Court’s search and 
seizure cases, with others quickly following suit.  For instance, Songer and Haire (1992) 
determined that facts in obscenity cases, along with ideology and precedent, are 
important determinants of outcomes in U.S. Courts of Appeals. 
Several others have also applied integrated approaches to a specific focus area, 
most notably, the death penalty.  Emmert and Traut (1994) and Traut and Emmert’s 
                                                 
4 In particular, Segal (1984) says that the race of the defendant is often closely examined. 
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(1998) studies of the California Supreme Court demonstrated that case facts, coupled 
with judicial ideology, are important determinants of death penalty decisions.  Similarly, 
Hall and Brace (1994; 1996) and Brace and Hall (1995; 1997) discovered that extralegal 
characteristics, particularly the judges’ political affiliation, and legal characteristics, 
specifically those that consider whether or not the capital murder involved statutorily 
defined aggravating factors (e.g., robbery, rape, multiple victims), are significant 
predictors of death penalty outcomes in U.S. State Supreme Courts.  Also combining the 
two main approaches to judicial decision making, George and Epstein (1992) determined 
the significant influence of both legal (e.g., crime proportionality, jury death qualification 
and both aggravating and mitigating circumstances) and extralegal factors (e.g., “repeat 
player” status) on death penalty decisions before the U.S. Supreme Court.  
Yet some scholars have challenged the validity of these legal based fact pattern 
models. As mentioned above, Segal and Spaeth (1993, 65; 2002) have argued that it is the 
attitudes of judges which drive decision making and that legal disputes are settled “in 
light of the facts of the case vis-à-vis the ideological attitudes and values of the justices.”  
(Emphasis added.) Thus according to these scholars, it is theoretically impossible to 
disentangle the effects of ideology from legal interpretation, since the latter is merely a 
function of the former.  Haynie et al. (2002) are among the few to have disputed this legal 
fact pattern approach, with their results closely coinciding with the assertions made by 
Segal and Spaeth (1993, 2002):  significant support was found for the attitudinal model of 
judicial decision making, while none was found for the legal model. 
In addition to ideology and case characteristics, research has further demonstrated 
that success in court is often contingent upon litigant resources (Kleck 1981; Clarke and 
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Koch 1976; Farrell and Swigert 1986).  “Repeat players,” or those possessing greater 
resources in terms of wealth, experience and rapport with the court on account of 
repeated litigation,5 are more likely to achieve success in case outcomes than “one 
shotters,” or those possessing lesser amounts of these resources6 (Galanter 1974). 
For instance, Songer and Sheehan (1992) found that “upperdogs” (e.g., state, local 
and federal government) fare better than “underdogs” (e.g., individuals) in the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals.  McGuire (1995) found a significant influential effect of counsel 
experience and determined that the “haves” usually achieve greater litigation success in 
the U.S. Supreme Court.  In particular, it is the executive branch’s representative, the 
Solicitor General, who enjoys the most success before the Court (McGuire 1998).  Others 
(e.g., George and Epstein 1992; Haynie et al. 2002) have also found similar results. 
Yet the degree to which resources are relevant in court outcomes has also been 
contested.  Sheehan, Mishler and Songer (1992) found that judicial ideology has a 
stronger impact on litigation success than do differences among litigants in terms of their 
resources and expertise in cases before the U.S. Supreme Court.  Moreover, it may be 
that Galanter’s (1974) theory of resource inequality is not applicable to all judicial 
contexts.  For instance, Haynie (1994, 769) discovered that in the Philippines the “have 
nots” achieve greater success than the “haves,” because the Philippine Supreme Court 
serves a “redistributive function” in order to “enhance its legitimacy as a political 
institution.”  Similar results were also evident in South Africa (Haynie 2003). 
                                                 
5 E.g., prosecutors or insurance companies (97). 
6 E.g., the criminally accused or a spouse in a divorce case (97). 
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 Existing literature on the U.S. legal system therefore suggests that factors in 
addition to both law and precedent are evident within the judicial decision-making 
process.  But are these theories of judicial behavior merely idiosyncratic? Or are these 
findings applicable to courts outside of the U.S. as well? 
The South African Judicial Context 
 
South Africa’s struggle with race relations undeniably has been both lengthy and 
arduous.  Entrenched within this struggle has been its legal system, and one institution 
that has played a particularly prominent role is South Africa’s highest court, the 
Appellate Division.  South Africa was officially formed with the South Africa Act of 
1909, which combined the four British colonies of South Africa into the Union of South 
Africa (Forsyth 1985, 1). Along with this Act, the legislature created the Appellate 
Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa. Replacing the superior courts of the 
former colonies, the Appellate Division was designed to serve as an appeal court.  Yet it 
did not serve as South Africa’s final appellate court until the 1950 abolition of the Privy 
Council, making the Appellate Division the South Africa’s highest court, or its court of 
last resort (Dugard 1978, 10; Forsyth 1985, 2; Haynie 2003, 31).   
 Although apartheid, or the separation of the races, had been a component of 
South African governance since the arrival of white settlers in 1652, more extreme and 
systematic separation measures followed the National Party Government’s rise to power 
in 1948 (Dugard 1978, 6). Upon gaining control of the government, the National Party 
specifically sought to accomplish two goals: (1) restore the power of the government to 
its Afrikaner heritage; and (2) institutionalize apartheid (Haynie 2003, 33).   
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The National Party’s goals were not so easily achieved, however, and its power 
was initially curtailed somewhat by the Appellate Division’s power to determine 
legislative acts to be ultra vires, or beyond the scope of the constitutionally derived 
powers of Parliament (Ellmann 1992, 104-112).  Using the “separate but equal” doctrine 
derived from the British common law, the Court negated several attempts of the 
legislature to separate the races. In response to the Court, however, the legislature passed 
the Separate Representation of Voters Act of 1951, which was designed to establish 
separate public facilities among the races (Haynie 2003, 34). 
 The Appellate Division was further weakened as a result of the Appellate 
Division Quorum Act 27 of 1955.  This act was the National Party’s response to the 
Court’s invalidation of the Separate Representation of Voters Act of 1951 and was 
intended to remove the “coloureds” from the voting rolls by a simple majority vote rather 
than the two-thirds vote constitutionally mandated (Forsyth 1985, 14; Ellmann 1992, 
13).7  The Act succeeded in limiting the Court’s power of judicial review by increasing 
the required quorum on “most” cases to five and a quorum of 11 in cases dealing with the 
legality of Acts of Parliament (Forsyth 1985, 15).  Since only six judges comprised the 
Court at that time, the Act called for the appointment of five additional judges, thus 
“diluting” the power of the incumbent members of the Court with the inclusion of these 
new judges.8 
                                                 
7 “Coloured” is a term of reference for individuals of mixed race.  Its use in South Africa does not carry the 
negative connotations associated with its use in the United States.  It should be noted that black voters had 
been previously removed with the requisite two-thirds majority.  The National Party wanted to ensure the 
franchise for whites only. 
8 The size of Parliament was also expanded to achieve the requisite two-thirds and the “coloured” voters 
were “constitutionally” removed from the voter rolls. 
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Thus the Appellate Division consisted of a Chief Justice and a varying number of 
Judges of Appeal,9 all of whom were white, given that a black judge never served on the 
Court during the era of apartheid (Dugard 1978, 11).  Before the 1961 Constitution Act, 
judges of the Appellate Division were chosen by the Governor General (Haynie 2003, 
31), but after 1961 were appointed by the cabinet, or the State President-in-Council 
(Dugard 1978, 10).  The retirement age was 70, and judges could not be removed unless 
by both request of Parliament and permission of the State President on the basis of 
“misbehavior” or “incapacity” (Dugard 1978, 10).  As a result of this design, Dugard 
(1978, 11) stated, “Inevitably, political considerations play[ed] an important part in the 
appointment of judges.”  Indeed they did, since at one point in its history more than half 
of the Court was staffed by appointees and presumed supporters of the National Party 
(Haynie 2003). 
The structural weakness of the Court therefore left it susceptible to the political 
influences of the apartheid system, consequently creating the potential to shape judicial 
decision making.  Nevertheless, Dugard (1978, 71-72) claimed that the common law of 
South Africa was “color-blind” and that the courts theoretically should not distinguish 
between blacks and whites in terms of basic civil rights and freedoms, with the exception 
of those rights specifically limited by the legislature. Similarly, Haynie (2003, 26) says 
that “judges were trained to appreciate the rule of law” and that the Roman-Dutch 
tradition “required that individual freedom be protected and only in those instances where 
Parliament specifically dictated inequality or specifically limited rights would courts 
sanction such restrictions” (115).   
                                                 
9 There were six Judges of Appeal in 1950 but by 1990 had grown to 18 (Haynie 2003, 31). 
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Despite this legal rhetoric, it is apparent that the Court functioned within a 
political environment to which it was undoubtedly not immune.  In this respect, did the 
stacking of the court in favor of the government succeed in creating a court that simply 
mirrored the political disposition of South Africa’s authoritarian regime?  Or was the 
Court capable of maintaining its independence and using its own discretion to challenge 
the regime’s repressive apartheid policies?  In a country that forbade the “scandalizing” 
and “contempt” of the Court,10 little research has been conducted on South Africa’s legal 
system to empirically test these questions. 
Given these conditions, the case of South Africa not only provides a unique 
opportunity to examine the role of political ideology in the judicial decision-making 
process, but it also allows for a critical analysis of the role that other legal and extralegal 
factors may have played within the opinions of the Appellate Division during the reign of 
the National Party and its political progeny, apartheid.  One area of law that is 
particularly amenable to such an analysis is that of the death penalty (e.g., Emmert and 
Traut 1994; Hall and Brace 1994, 1996; Brace and Hall 1995, 1997; Traut and Emmert 
1998).  This specific issue area is chosen because ideology is assumed to play a 
particularly critical role within the death penalty sentencing process.   Because the issue 
at stake was, of course, the life or death of the defendant, it is assumed that ideologies 
among the judges were much more exacerbated in these types of cases than in less 
divisive areas of law.  Thus the salience of ideology within death penalty cases makes 
                                                 
10 One of the most famous cases to involve the “scandalization of the court” is that of Professor Van 
Niekerk of the University of Natal (Durban) who published an article in the South African Law Journal, 
which addressed the possibility that sentencing differed among black and white defendants in capital 
punishment cases.  He was charged with “contempt of the court” for “bring[ing] the judiciary into 
contempt, to violate their dignity and respect, and to cast suspicion upon the administration of justice” 
(Dugard 1978, 292-293). 
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this issue area more conducive to analyzing the various political forces at play within the 
judicial decision making process.   
Much like the United States, capital punishment has long been an appendage of 
South Africa’s legal system.  Prior to South Africa’s 1990 moratorium on the death 
penalty and subsequent reforms in its criminal laws (Sloth-Nielson et al. 1991, 11-13), 
the sentence of death could either be compulsory, or based upon judicial discretion for 
cases involving murder.11  In either type of case, however, it was the judges who decided 
whether or not extenuating circumstances were present, thus leaving the determination of 
the existence of these factors subject to judicial discretion.  For murder cases in which the 
judge deemed an absence of extenuating circumstances, the death penalty was statutorily 
mandated.  Conversely, in cases of murder for which the judge deemed the presence of 
extenuating circumstances, sentences were then statutorily dependent upon judicial 
discretion, in which judges—not the law—determined the imposition of the death 
penalty.   
Extenuating circumstances were analogous to the mitigating circumstances 
currently employed by several U.S. states within their death penalty sentencing schemes.  
They were designed to provide a means of decreasing the moral culpability of the 
defendant, and examples of these circumstances included the youthfulness of the 
defendant,12 a woman convicted of killing her newly born child,13 the influence of 
alcohol or drugs, witchcraft and the presence of a psychopathic condition, among others.  
Crimes also warranting the death penalty—though not statutorily mandating it—were 
                                                 
11 In 1995 the death penalty was finally deemed unconstitutional by the new Constitutional Court in State v 
Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
12 The Criminal Procedure Act of 1977 (2)(a) 
13 The Criminal Procedure Act of 1977 (2)(a) 
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treason, kidnapping, child-stealing, rape, robbery and attempted robbery, housebreaking, 
sabotage or terrorism (Hiemstra 1977, 146-147; Dugard 1977, 103).     
Also similar to the legal system of the United States, South Africa provided legal 
counsel to its indigent defendants.  Yet its pro deo, or literally “for God,” system of 
counsel was only available to indigent defendants in death penalty cases heard before the 
Appellate Division, or its highest court (Dugard 1977, 46).  Separate from other forms of 
legal aid funded by tariffs, the pro deo system was not mandated by law, but rather was 
an “established” tradition practiced by the Court (McQuoid-Mason 1982, 11).  Pro deo 
advocates were appointed to cases by the Bar Council and were usually private 
practitioners, paid R200 a day by the state and generally not provided an attorney for 
assistance14 (McQuoid-Mason 1982, 12; Sloth-Nielson et al. 1991, 5).  Moreover, pro 
deo advocates are usually the “most junior” and “inexperienced” within the legal 
profession (Van Niekerk 1969, 72-73; Sloth-Nielson et al. 1991, 5), lacking what 
Galanter (1974) referred to as “repeat player” status before the Court. 
Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, the Appellate Division lacked discretionary 
control over its docket.  Appeals to the Appellate Division generally arrived to the Court 
via two routes: (1) cases were either certified to it from the lower courts15; or (2) 
petitioners denied leave to appeal in the lower courts could seek reprieve directly from 
the Appellate Division.  Appeals resulting from the former were much more common 
than the latter, and a result of this design is that the Court’s docket was largely comprised 
of leaves to appeal which they were required to hear (Haynie 2003). Therefore, it may be 
                                                 
14 Attorneys usually assist advocates by gathering pertinent information, e.g., interviewing witnesses or 
investigating the facts surrounding the case (Sloth-Nielson et al. 1991, 5). 
15 It should be noted though that lower court judges were expected to refuse to grant leaves to appeal in 
cases that lacked substantive questions of law.  
    14
that these disputes represented routine legal challenges easily disposed of by the Court, 
rather than major constitutional and statutory disputes that were more likely to engender 
disagreement.   
Yet the Appellate Division was able to maintain a minimal amount of discretion 
in cases arriving to the Court in the more atypical route, or rather, through appeals by 
petitioners seeking reprieve from the Appellate Division.  In the context of capital 
punishment, it is plausible that the Court was more willing to accept a reprieve in this 
case, because a denial surely meant death for the petitioner.  Another potential 
consequence of this discretion is that the Court potentially would be less likely to take a 
case that it would confirm, since this would not only seem unnecessary, but it also would 
be politically problematic under apartheid circumstances in which the Court's legitimacy 
was already in question.  Therefore, the Court may have been more likely to both accept 
and reverse the death penalty when these various factors were taken into consideration.  It 
is possible then that case outcomes substantively differed based upon the route by which 
they arrived at the Court.  
Juxtaposing South Africa with the United States, it is clear both the 
commonalities and differences that existed between the two legal systems.  In both 
systems the death penalty had long been considered a conventional form of punishment, 
and the sentencing structure within each system statutorily permitted a defined amount of 
judicial discretion.  But unlike its democratic counterpart, the U.S. Supreme Court, the 
Appellate Division lacked control over its own docket and, further, was embedded within 
an authoritarian apartheid regime.  Notwithstanding these variances, if theories based 
upon the U.S. judicial system are truly generalizable, the effects of both legal and 
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extralegal factors found within the American context should similarly appear in the 
comparative framework of South Africa.  Therefore, in combining the various elements 
of South Africa’s death penalty system along with its political history, it is quite evident 
that the Appellate Division is ripe for this type of exploration. 
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MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 
Grounded in both evidence and theory posited by scholars of the U.S. courts, this 
study explores the extent to which politics plays a role within the judicial decision-
making process of the South African Appellate Division, 1950-1990—roughly the rise 
and fall of apartheid in South Africa.  Specifically, it examines the effects of both legal 
and extralegal factors within this overall process.   
Guided by existing models of judicial behavior presented throughout the 
literature, the legal model is operationalized through the use of legal characteristics, or 
facts statutorily related to the law, provided in each individual case.  Concomitantly, the 
extralegal model consists of judicial ideology, litigant resources and facts unrelated to the 
law surrounding each case.  Recognizing the significant attention scholars have given to 
both models of judicial behavior, this study combines the two in order to create a more 
complex, integrated approach of judicial decision making and applies this model to the 
case of South Africa. 
The scope of judicial decision making is confined to a single issue area, in this 
case, the death penalty, in order to meaningfully analyze the effects of both legal and 
extralegal factors on case decisions, which is a method consistent with a number of 
studies throughout the literature (Segal 1984, 1986; George and Epstein 1992; Songer 
and Haire 1992; Emmert and Traut 1994; Hall and Brace 1994, 1996; Brace and Hall 
1995, 1997; Traut and Emmert 1998).  The source of data utilized in this study was 
obtained from a dataset compiled by Haynie (2003), which includes all published cases of 
the South African Appellate Division throughout the time period 1950-1990.   
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Over the course of the 41-year time period studied, the Court published 220 cases 
in which the primary issue was the death penalty.  Using these cases, a statistical model is 
estimated to depict the death penalty decisions of the Appellate Division as a function of 
legal and extralegal case facts, judicial ideology, litigant resources and the type of appeal 
granted to the Appellate Division. Additional models are employed to estimate the 
interaction effects of judicial ideology when combined with legal case facts, included to 
determine the influence of ideology in interpreting legal stimuli.  Because the outcome of 
death penalty decisions is estimated, the dependent variable in this analysis is either to 
affirm (coded 1) or to overturn the death sentence (coded 0).   Due to the dichotomous 
nature of the dependent variable, logistic regression analysis is used in the estimation of 
the statistical models.  
The Legal Model: Crime Characteristics 
 
In much of the current research, crime characteristics are often included as a 
means of gauging the degree to which legal factors play a role within the judicial 
decision-making process, and the legal model has generally been operationalized through 
measures based upon legal doctrine (e.g., Segal 1984, 1986; George and Epstein 1992; 
Hall and Brace 1994, 1996; Brace and Hall 1995, 1997).  As discussed above, South 
African law deemed appropriate the sentence of death for cases involving murder, 
treason, kidnapping, child-stealing, rape, robbery and attempted robbery, housebreaking, 
sabotage or terrorism and mandatory for murder cases lacking extenuating circumstances 
(Dugard 1977, 103).  Therefore, in order to effectively operationalize the legal model of 
judicial behavior, these various aspects of the South African law must be incorporated 
into the analyses.    
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In cases of murder in which there were no extenuating circumstances either 
presented by the defendant or found by the judge, judges at the trial level were statutorily 
required to impose the death sentence.  Based on this legal doctrine, it is expected that 
the Appellate Division will affirm the lower courts’ decisions when the murder case 
(MURDER) does not possess extenuating circumstances (coded 1 if present; 0 if 
otherwise), as determined by the Court.  On the other hand, because the law allows 
judges to find extenuating circumstances as a means of decreasing the defendants’ moral 
culpability in cases of murder (MURDEXT), it is posited that the Court will be more 
likely to overturn the death sentence when extenuating circumstances are present (coded 
1; 0 if otherwise).  Likewise, it is expected that the Court will be more likely to overturn 
the sentence when the case involves crimes considered less serious than murder 
(OTHER), such as robbery or rape (coded 1; 0 if otherwise). 
The Extralegal Model: Ideology, Case Facts and Litigant Resources 
 
A plethora of research on the U.S. courts has clearly demonstrated the effect of 
ideology on judicial decisions.  However, measures of ideology comparable to those of 
Segal (1984) and Segal et al. (1995), which would be helpful to test the effects of this 
variable, are unavailable for the South African judges.  In order to create an independent 
measure of ideology to be included in the models, the ideology for each judge16 is 
obtained by calculating the percentage of liberal, or “pro-underdog,” votes cast in all 
criminal cases, excluding the votes cast in all death penalty decisions.17  The benefits to 
                                                 
16 Individual ideology is a dichotomous variable (1 = vote to affirm the criminal sentence, a “conservative” 
decision; 3 = vote to overturn the criminal sentence, a “liberal” decision). 
17 It should be noted that judges with fewer than five votes in criminal cases are excluded from the analysis.  
When this occurs, the panel ideology is calculated using the ideology of the remaining judges on the panel. 
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this approach are two-fold.  First, the votes cast in the Court’s criminal cases will most 
closely coincide with the ideology associated with death penalty cases.  Second, by 
removing the death penalty votes, Schubert’s (1962) tautology or “circularity problem” of 
predicting votes via the votes themselves is safely avoided. 
The Appellate Division generally sat in panels of three judges, but for more 
“complex” criminal cases, sat in panels of five (Haynie 2003, 32).  Because of this 
design, the average ideology of the panel (PANLIB) is calculated for each death penalty 
case.  Theory suggests that liberal judges are more concerned than conservative judges 
with protecting individual rights and liberties, particularly for defendants in criminal 
cases.  Therefore, an inverse relationship is expected to exist between the panel ideology 
and the death penalty outcome, because as the ideology mean increases—thus becoming 
more liberal, or “pro-underdog,”—the more likely the panel is expected to overturn the 
death penalty. 
 Similar to the legal model of judicial behavior, extralegal models are also 
operationalized through the use of case facts.  In empirical studies of the death penalty, 
scholars have included both defendant and victim characteristics in their analyses.  
According to Segal (1984, 892), models of extralegal factors usually include a focus on 
the defendants’ race.  As a result, many scholars have demonstrated the negative effects 
of race in the U.S. judicial system, particularly in terms of case disposition (Redelet 
1981; Paternoster 1984; Haynie and Dover 1994) and sentence severity (Zatz 1984; 
Albonetti 1997).  Research has thus demonstrated that black defendants are those most 
likely to be indicted for capital murder and generally receive harsher sentences than white 
defendants.   
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In the case of South Africa, comparable assertions have been made about the role 
of race in death penalty sentencing.  Van Niekerk (1969; 1970), a well-known South 
African scholar, not only questioned the validity of capital punishment but also charged 
that race was frequently applied to the sentencing process.  In a survey study of South 
African advocates, Van Niekerk (1969) discovered that over half of his sample believed 
that capital punishment was “meted out on a differential basis to the different races” 
(467).  Extending theory derived from both the American and South African literatures, a 
positive relationship is expected between race (DEFRACE) and sentencing outcomes in 
that non-black defendants (coded 1) will be more likely than white defendants (coded 0) 
to have their death sentences affirmed.18 
 The gender of the defendant is another possible determinant of sentencing 
outcomes.  Scholars have discovered that convicted males receive harsher penalties than 
convicted females (Albonetti 1997; Farrell and Swigert 1986).  One possible theory is 
that judges often espouse paternalistic beliefs towards women, thus resulting in sentence 
differentials between male and female defendants.  Based on this theoretical 
understanding, it is expected that male defendants (coded 1) will be more likely than 
female defendants (coded 0) to receive the death penalty (DEFMALE).   
Relatedly, sentencing outcomes are often associated with victim characteristics, 
and among these, the most notable is the gender of the victim.  Research has 
demonstrated that adjudication is more severe when the victim is female than when the 
                                                 
18 An important caveat must be noted regarding the coding of the race variable.  The defendants’ race is not 
always available in the text of the case.  In these instances, the race of the defendant is derived from the 
defendants’ name, as listed in the case title, e.g., State v. Hlongwana 1975 (4) SA 567 (A). 
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victim is male (Farrell and Swigert 1986).19  One possible explanation is that females are 
perceived as more vulnerable within society, and, consequently, the sentence of death is 
deemed more appropriate in such cases.  Likewise, children are perceived by society in 
this manner, and a similar underlying theoretical basis can be assumed when the victim is 
a child.  Therefore, in cases when the victim is a female or child (VICFEML), it is 
expected that the panel will be more likely to affirm the sentence (coded 1; 0 if 
otherwise) than when the victim is an adult male (VICMALE [coded 1; 0 if otherwise]).20   
In several key pieces throughout the literature, litigant resources have been 
significantly related to court outcomes (Galanter 1974; Songer and Sheehan 1992; 
McGuire 1996), though the results have been somewhat mixed (Sheehan, Mishler and 
Songer 1992; Haynie 1994).  In death penalty cases, however, the defendant is clearly the 
“underdog” or “have not” in relation to the state, which has an obligation to administer 
justice.  On the whole, defendants possess fewer monetary resources than the state, and, 
further, criminal defendants lack the “repeat player” advantage also enjoyed by the state 
(Galanter 1974; George and Epstein 1992).   
In South Africa scholars of the legal system have sharply criticized the pro deo 
system of counsel, charging that advocates in this system are often the most 
“inexperienced” and “junior” within the legal profession (Van Niekerk 1969, 72-73; 
Sloth-Nielson et al. 1991, 5).  As a result, it is expected that the death sentence will be 
                                                 
19 Others such as Brace and Hall (1995; 1997) and Hall and Brace (1994; 1996) have incorporated “female” 
into their integrated models of judicial behavior, but have used this measure as a means of operationalizing 
the legal model.  This approach is not appropriate in the case of South Africa, because the gender of the 
victim is statutorily irrelevant in death penalty sentencing.  Theoretically, however, it may be used as an 
extralegal factor in sentencing considerations. 
20 Though it would be very interesting to analyze the extralegal effects of additional victim characteristics 
in each of the death penalty cases, such as the victims’ age and race, these data are not consistently 
provided within the published cases of the Appellate Division. 
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affirmed when advocates are pro deo (PRODEO), or appointed by the Court (coded 1), 
than when they are not appointed by the Court (coded 0).  
The structure of the appeal process resulted in the Court’s inability to control its 
own docket.  Yet the Court was able to maintain a limited amount of discretion through 
its acceptance of cases from direct leaves of appeal.  Theoretically, it may be that the 
Court, in order to avoid diluting its own power in the context of apartheid wherein its 
legitimacy was already threatened, did not accept cases that would simply lead to an 
affirmation of the lower court’s decision.  With this said, it is plausible that the Court 
would not only be more likely to accept death penalty cases—since the denial of a leave 
to appeal would almost certainly mean death for the appellant—but that these cases 
would also result in reversals.  Therefore, it is expected that when the Appellate Division 
grants the leave to appeal (ADGRANT [coded 1; 0 if otherwise]), the Court will be more 
likely to reverse the outcome of the lower court than if the case arrives from the more 
typical route, a leave of appeal granted by the lower court (TRIAL [coded 1; 0 if 
otherwise]).21 
Finally, scholars such as Segal and Spaeth (1993; 2002) have strongly contested 
the credibility of the legal model, arguing that it is theoretically impossible to disentangle 
the effects of personal preferences and attitudes from legal interpretation.  Thus 
according to the attitudinal model of decision making, legal interpretation is merely a 
function of ideology.  Further exploring this argument, the specified legal factors are 
interacted with ideology and included within a second model to test whether or not the 
                                                 
21 It should be noted that two separate variables were created in order to overcome the problem of missing 
data for this measure. 
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use of these legal measures significantly differs among the panels (i.e., among liberal and 
conservative panels).  If differences are found to exist, then the findings will simply serve 
to reaffirm the assertions of the attitudinal model of decision making. 
The multiplicative terms are specifically used within the analyses to gauge the 
strength of the linkage between legal interpretation and the Court’s decisions as ideology 
varies, and they include as follows:  ideology and murder with no extenuating 
circumstances (PANLIB*MURDER); and ideology and other serious crimes 
(PANLIB*OTHER).  Because liberal panels are expected to be those most likely to 
overturn the death penalty, negative coefficients are posited for the interaction variables.  
This implies that as ideology increases—thus becoming more liberal—the relationship 
between the usage of legal factors and the Court’s decisions strengthens.  The implication 
of this hypothesis is that the presence of certain legal factors should have a more 
pronounced effect for liberal panels than for their conservative counterparts.  Intuitively, 
this makes sense.  Conservative panels, which generally rule in favor of the state, are 
potentially more likely to affirm the sentence of death, regardless of the circumstances 
surrounding the case (i.e., the presence or absence of extenuating circumstances).  On the 
other hand, liberal panels, which tend to rule in favor of the defendant, are more likely to 
overturn the sentence.  Since liberals should be more likely to overturn the death 
sentence, they should particularly be more likely to do so in cases wherein they are 
permitted more discretion, or rather, in those cases whereby judicial discretion is 
statutorily defined (i.e., cases with the presence of extenuating circumstances).  
Although the full (interaction) model will reveal the potential significant 
differences in the effect of ideology across the specified legal factors, it will not provide a 
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means of testing the degree to which the presence of these factors significantly impacts 
the Court’s decision to either affirm or overturn the sentence of death.  Furthermore, 
because it also controls for the other variables within the model—such as the extralegal 
factors and the type of leave to appeal granted—there is no way to compare these effects 
across the different types of legal stimuli.  Subsequent models are thus included to 
separate out these various effects on the Court’s decisions and are filtered by the three 
specified legal factors.   
In summary, several statistical models are proposed to examine the effects of both 
legal and extralegal factors on the decision making process of the Appellate Division of 
South Africa throughout the time period 1950-1990.  First, death penalty decisions before 
the Court are depicted as a function of legal and extralegal case facts, ideology, litigant 
resources and the form of leave to appeal granted to the defendant.  A second model that 
includes interaction terms is employed to test the effect of judicial ideology when 
coupled with legal characteristics.  Finally, three separate models for each of the three 
legal factors are estimated to determine the direct impact of the legal factors on the 
Court’s decisions.  Extending theory derived from the existing American judicial 
literature, this study posits that the affirmation of the capital sentence is dependent upon 
the severity of the crime, the conservatism of the panel, the type of leave to appeal 
granted, whether the victim is a female or a child and, finally, if the defendant is male, 
nonwhite or represented by pro deo counsel.  Moreover, the attitudinal model of decision 
making assumes that ideology will have an interactive effect with the use of legal stimuli. 
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RESULTS 
 
Table 1 presents the logistic regression estimates of both the baseline and full 
models of death penalty decisions in the South African Appellate Division, 1950-1990.  
The onset of the results presents an unexpected surprise:  none of the variables employed 
within the baseline model have a strong and significant effect on the Court’s death 
penalty decisions.  Chi-square does indicate, however, that the overall model is 
significant. 
First, there is no evidence to support the legal model of judicial decision making 
within the baseline model.  In order to avoid perfect multicollinearity, one of the legal 
variables, murder with extenuating circumstances, is dropped from the analysis, and the 
effect of this measure is effectively captured in the intercept.  It was posited that the 
Court would be more likely to affirm the trial or lower court’s decision when the case of 
murder lacked extenuating circumstances and, concomitantly, that the Court would 
overturn the sentence of death in cases of murder with the presence of extenuating 
circumstances or in cases based upon other serious crimes.  Yet all three of the legal 
variables, MURDER, OTHER and MURDEXT, the effect of which is captured within 
the intercept, fail to reach any levels of statistical significance, indicating that the 
Appellate Division was neither more nor less likely to depend upon these particular legal 
factors within its sentencing process. 
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Table 1. Baseline and Full (Interactive) Models of Death Penalty Decisions in the 
South African Appellate Division, 1950-1990 
 Baseline Model Full (Interactive) Model 
Variable b s.e. b s.e. 
MURDER 0.336 0.335 -1.788 1.863 
PANLIB*MURDER -------- -------- 5.094 4.553 
OTHER 0.168 0.510 -7.757*** 3.215 
PANLIB*OTHER -------- -------- 18.555++ 7.602 
PANLIB -2.365* 1.785 -4.889*** 2.171 
DEFRACE -0.660+ 0.344 -0.607+ 0.353 
DEFMALE 7.563 18.158 7.555 18.236 
VICFEML 0.650 0.539 0.632 0.548 
VICMALE 0.018 0.518 -0.024 0.525 
PRODEO -0.073 0.322 -0.082 0.330 
TRIAL 0.042 0.488 -0.135 0.506 
ADGRANT -0.522 0.545 -0.750* 0.566 










*** prob. <0.01, using a 1-tailed test; +++ prob. <0.01, using a 2-tailed test 
  ** prob. <0.05, using a 1-tailed test;  ++ prob. <0.05, using a 2-tailed test 
    * prob. <0.10, using a 1-tailed test;    + prob. <0.10, using a 2-tailed test 
 
The role of litigant resources in decisions before the Court has also not been fully 
established within this initial analysis.  Based on Galanter’s (1974) theory of resource 
inequality and the various criticisms lodged at South Africa’s pro deo system (Van 
Niekerk 1969, 72-73; Sloth-Nielson et al. 1991, 5), it was expected that the presence of 
pro deo counsel would lead to an affirmation of the lower court’s imposition of the death 
penalty.  Although the sign is in its expected negative direction, the insignificance of the 
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PRODEO coefficient demonstrates that the relationship between litigant resources and 
court outcomes does not necessarily exist, since defendants represented by appointed 
counsel were neither more nor less likely to have their sentence of death affirmed. 
The way by which the leave to appeal to the Appellate Division was granted also does 
not seem to have influenced the Court’s decisions.  Theoretically, it makes sense that the 
Court would have been more likely to overturn the sentence of death in cases whereby it 
granted the leave to appeal.  But the insignificance of the coefficients of both ADGRANT 
and TRIAL does not provide evidence for this assumption, since there appears to be no 
systematic relationship between the form of leave granted and the death penalty decisions 
of the Court. 
The results also indicate that the extralegal case facts within the baseline model—
with the possible exception of race—are not significant predictors of the Appellate 
Division’s decisions.  For instance, it was posited that the Court would be more likely to 
affirm the sentence when the defendant was male, based upon the notion that judges often 
tend to treat female defendants more leniently than their male counterparts.  Despite its 
correct positive direction, the insignificance of the DEFMALE coefficient demonstrates 
that the judges of the Appellate Division were neither more nor less likely to affirm the 
sentence of death for either male or female defendants. 
It also appears that the Court did not rely upon the victims’ characteristics.  It was 
suggested that females and children were considered the most vulnerable within society, 
leading to the hypothesis that the death penalty would be considered more appropriate in 
cases involving these types of victims.  The findings do not support this suggestion, 
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however, as is evidenced by the insignificant coefficients of both the VICFEML and 
VICMALE variables.   
On the other hand, there does appear to be some sort of link between the panels’ 
ideology and the sentencing outcomes of the Appellate Division.  It was posited that 
liberal panels, or those most committed to upholding the civil rights and liberties of 
criminal defendants, would be more likely than conservative panels to overturn the 
sentence of death.  The negative coefficient of PANLIB (significant at the .10 level) 
suggests some support for this hypothesis.  However, the null hypothesis that the slope 
coefficient is equal to zero cannot be rejected, nor can it be fully determined whether or 
not a significant relationship exists between panel ideology and the Court’s decisions. 
Another potentially important finding to emerge from the results involves the use of 
the defendants’ race within the sentencing process.  Based on the findings of the U.S. 
courts and the assertions of a minority of South African scholars, it was posited that the 
Court would be more likely to affirm the death sentence when the defendant was 
nonwhite.  The negative coefficient of DEFRACE (significant at the .10 level, using a 
two-tailed test) demonstrates the opposite effect, specifically that the Court was more 
likely to overturn the sentence of death in these instances.  Again, however, the null 
hypothesis that no relationship exists between race and sentencing cannot be confidently 
rejected. 
Thus the initial results reveal very little about the decision-making process of the 
Appellate Division, demonstrating no support for the legal model and modest support for 
the attitudinal model of judicial decision making.  Is it possible then to conclude that the 
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theoretical basis derived from the American context simply fails to similarly relate to the 
case of South Africa?  A more complex model is needed in order to test this possibility. 
Table 1 further presents the logistic regression estimates of the full (interactive) 
model of death penalty decisions of the South African Appellate Division, 1950-1990, 
which includes interactions between panel ideology and the legal variables, in addition to 
the variables included within the initial analysis.  Several of the hypotheses remain 
unsupported, and, once more, there appears to be no systematic link between the 
decisions of the Court and the victims’ characteristics, the defendants’ gender or the 
presence of pro deo counsel.   
The coefficient for DEFRACE, however, continues to be in an unexpected negative 
direction but, yet again, is only significant at the more relaxed .10 level.  It also appears 
that the type of leave granted to appeal to the Court now has some effect.  Despite its 
significance at the weaker .10 level, the negative coefficient of ADGRANT is consistent 
with theoretical expectations that the Court would be more likely to overturn the death 
penalty in cases whereby it granted the leave to appeal. 
Although the initial findings are substantively important to understanding the 
Court’s decisions, the inclusion of the interactions reveal a much more interesting—
perhaps even puzzling—story.  As mentioned above, the multiplicative terms are 
included as a means of gauging the effect of legal interpretation as ideology varies.  The 
findings suggest that this phenomenon has indeed occurred within the Court’s decisions, 
particularly vis-à-vis the cases left up to judicial discretion. 
Once again, to avoid perfect multicollinearity within the model it is necessary to 
drop a legal variable from the analysis.  Theoretically, murder with extenuating 
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circumstances is the most important legal variable among the three.  It is in these types of 
cases that liberal judges are potentially most likely to overturn the sentence of death 
because judicial discretion is statutorily built into the death-sentencing scheme.  
Therefore, MURDEXT is dropped from the analysis to test:  (1) whether or not ideology 
has a significantly different effect for this type of case than it has for others; and (2) 
whether or not the effect is significantly related to the outcome of the case.  Since the 
effects of ideology for both MURDER and OTHER are captured within their respective 
interaction coefficients, the coefficient for ideology, PANLIB, serves to capture the effect 
of ideology in cases possessing extenuating circumstances. 
Inspecting the PANLIB coefficient, ideology has a clear and significant effect on 
cases of murder with extenuating circumstances.  First, the high significance level (at the 
.01 level) of the coefficient suggests that ideology has a more pronounced effect for cases 
possessing extenuating circumstances than it does for other types of cases.  Second, the 
negative direction of the coefficient demonstrates that the effect of ideology is 
significantly related to reversals in cases possessing extenuating circumstances.  
Therefore, the findings are consistent with theoretical expectations and illustrate that 
there is a significant difference between liberal and conservative panels for cases 
involving extenuating circumstances and, specifically, that liberal panels were 
significantly more likely than conservative panels to overturn the sentence of death.   
A similar relationship does not seem to exist in cases of murder without 
extenuating circumstances. The insignificant coefficient of PANLIB*MURDER reveals 
that ideology does not have a significantly different effect for these types of cases, 
suggesting that perhaps liberal panels were neither more nor less likely than conservative 
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panels to overturn the sentence of death in these specific cases.  Furthermore, the 
insignificant coefficient of MURDER indicates that the absence of extenuating 
circumstances in cases of murder was unrelated to the Court’s decisions. 
Another interesting finding consistent with theoretical expectations is that the 
Court was more likely to overturn the sentence of death for less serious crimes, which is 
indicated by the negative and highly significant (at the .01 level) coefficient of OTHER.  
One puzzling finding, however, concerns the interaction between other serious crimes 
and ideology.  The results reveal a positive coefficient for PANLIB*OTHER, which 
seems to indicate that more liberal panels were more likely to affirm the sentence of 
death for cases involving other serious crimes.  Theoretically, this relationship makes no 
sense.  However, this measure only reveals whether or not a significant difference in the 
effect of ideology exists for cases involving other serious crimes in comparison to cases 
without extenuating circumstances.  It does not demonstrate whether or not the Court was 
actually more likely to affirm the sentence of death in these cases.  Therefore, it is 
possible that liberal judges were not significantly more likely to affirm the sentence of 
death.  In order to examine this possibility, a model for each legal factor is needed to 
assess their individual effects on ideology.   
Table 2 presents the logistic regression estimates for three separate models of the 
Court’s decisions filtered by each of the three specified legal factors.  These models not 
only allow for in-group examinations of the exact influence of ideology, but they also 
permit the remaining variables to vary across groups since they are no longer held 
constant against the legal variables as they were in the previous models. 
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The findings are fairly consistent with those in the full (interaction) model.  The 
first model, murder with no extenuating circumstances, again reveals no relationship 
between ideology and the Court’s decision to either affirm or overturn the sentence of 
death.  It does, however, indicate a positive relationship between the presence of pro deo 
counsel and the Court’s affirmation of the death sentence.  Although the coefficient of 
PRODEO is in its expected positive direction, it is only significant at the .10 level, 
indicating a modest relationship between pro deo counsel and the Court’s decisions. 
Table 2. Legal Models of Death Penalty Decisions in the South African Appellate 
Division, 1950-1990 





Variable b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. 
PANLIB -0.289 4.331 -4.915** 2.253 16.189+ 8.736 
DEFRACE -0.116 0.662 -1.119+++ 0.456 -1.532 2.151 
DEFMALE 6.519 22.246 8.271 20.489 -------- -------- 
VICFEM 0.171 0.994 1.320* 0.845 10.115 65.992 
VICMALE -0.650 0.939 0.612 0.786 8.900 66.013 
PRODEO 1.101* 0.586 -0.767 0.495 -2.396 1.950 
TRIAL -1.440 1.214 -0.372 0.710 0.976 1.641 
ADGRANT -0.952 1.295 -1.295* 0.797 -3.011 2.661 













*** prob. <0.01, using a 1-tailed test; +++ prob. <0.01, using a 2-tailed test 
  ** prob. <0.05, using a 1-tailed test;  ++ prob. <0.05, using a 2-tailed test 
    * prob. <0.10, using a 1-tailed test;    + prob. <0.10, using a 2-tailed test 
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The second model, murder with extenuating circumstances, is perhaps the most 
important set of findings.  First, the ideology coefficient is highly significant (at the .01 
level) and in its expected negative direction.  Consistent with theoretical expectations, the 
Court was more likely to overturn the sentence of death in cases wherein judicial 
discretion was statutorily permitted.  The effect of race is particularly pronounced within 
this model as well, as is evidenced by the highly significant (at the .01 level) negative 
coefficient of DEFRACE.  Similar to previous findings, this relationship again suggests 
that the Court was more likely to overturn the death sentence for nonwhite defendants. 
Other interesting findings include the effects of both the status of the victim and 
the leave of appeal granted by the Appellate Division.  The positive coefficient of the 
VICFEML variable is consistent with theoretical expectations that the Court would be 
more likely to affirm the death penalty in cases in which the victim was either a child or 
female.  The negative coefficient of ADGRANT (significant at the .10 level) reveals that 
the Court was more likely to overturn the death sentence when it granted the leave to 
appeal than when the trial court granted the appeal.   
The third and final model, “other serious crimes,” reveals one critical finding, 
which is that a significant relationship may not exist between ideology and the Court’s 
decision to affirm the death penalty in this particular set of cases.  In the full (interactive) 
model the interaction between panel ideology and other serious crimes 
(PANLIB*OTHER) was both positive and highly significant, indicating that liberal 
panels might have been more likely to affirm the death penalty.  Within this final model 
the coefficient for PANLIB is again in a positive direction, but now it is only significant 
at the .10 level, suggesting a modest relationship between ideology and the Court’s 
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decision in other serious cases.  While this finding is theoretically perplexing, it does not 
necessarily exist given the instability of the model.  There are only 22 OTHER cases out 
of a total of 216 death penalty cases included within the various analyses.  Therefore, it 
may be that this anomaly is simply a result of a small sample size, which makes the 
model unstable and the finding particularly questionable.22 
                                                 
22 GENDER drops out of the analysis because of a lack of variation within this set of cases. 
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DISCUSSION 
 
So what do these various findings suggest?  First of all, the significant effect of 
ideology reveals that extralegal factors were indeed at play within the decision-making 
process of the Appellate Division.  Thus the attitudinal model posited by scholars of the 
American courts is certainly applicable to the South African legal system.  But as also 
demonstrated by the American context, ideology is merely one facet of a more complex 
process, and the various other findings to emerge from the analyses are indicative of this 
complexity. 
For instance, the effect of ideology was modest within the initial analysis but 
became more prevalent once the cases were filtered by the specified legal factors.  
Moreover, ideology had a particularly strong and significant effect in murder cases 
involving extenuating circumstances and was only marginally related to the other legal 
stimuli.  What are the implications of these findings?  South Africa’s provision of 
extenuating circumstances provided a built-in mechanism for judicial discretion, so it is 
clear why ideology was particularly significant within this given context.  One 
implication then is that ideology had a more pronounced effect where discretion was 
statutorily permitted—in the presence of extenuating circumstances—but had less of an 
effect given the institutional constraints of the law—in the absence of extenuating 
circumstances.  A second implication is that the findings are consistent with the 
attitudinal model supporting its generalizability to other legal contexts. 
Another key finding to emerge from the results is that death penalty sentencing in 
the Appellate Division may have been contingent upon the race of the victim, particularly 
if the defendant was nonwhite. The results indicate that the death penalty was more likely 
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to have been overturned for nonwhite defendants—a finding that is clearly inconsistent 
with theoretical expectations.  So why did this opposite effect occur?   There are several 
possible explanations. 
 First, little is known about the origin or background of each particular death 
penalty case.  Applying yet another theory derived from the American context, it may be 
that race was used as a factor in the disposition of the case and that nonwhites were more 
likely to be both indicted for and convicted of capital murder (Redelet 1981; Paternoster 
1984; Haynie and Dover 1994).  If this is true, the Appellate Division may have been 
more likely to overturn the death sentence in attempt to remedy an egregious bias based 
upon race found in the court below.  Conversely, it may be that racism is evident in the 
Court’s decisions because white judges held white defendants to be more culpable than 
the less “cultured” and therefore less culpable “native.”  This colonial paternalism could 
also potentially explain the results.  In order to fully assess these potential relationships, 
future research should attempt to focus on the effects of race within the lower court 
systems. 
Another possibility is that courts in authoritarian systems may function differently 
than those in democratic systems.  Yet in either type of system, judges generally reside 
within a political context, and in the case of South Africa, one that was deeply entrenched 
in apartheid.  It is possible then that the judges of the Appellate Division, recognizing the 
inevitable demise of a regime based on this system, chose to utilize their powers of 
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judicial discretion to challenge the authoritarian regime and status quo of apartheid by 
consistently ruling in favor of the nonwhite defendants.23 
Similarly, the Court may have ruled in favor of the political “underdog” in an 
attempt to both exhibit its independence from the authoritarian regime and defend its 
legitimacy to the world (Haynie 1994; 1995).24  How might have this occurred?  The 
Appellate Division, although structurally weakened and clearly plagued by the political 
influences of the National Party, often served as the final authority in the implementation 
of the government’s repressive apartheid policies.  It may be that the Court used its 
limited power of review to thwart the government’s advances in the apartheid policy area.  
Based on its previous collisions with the government, however, this defiance would have 
had to be limited.  As a result, the negative effect of race demonstrates that cases 
involving the death penalty may have been one area of the Court’s docket subtly used to 
exert its independence from the government  
Several of the expected relationships do not, however, materialize within the 
analyses.  For instance, a significant relationship was not fully established between 
litigant resources, as operationalized by pro deo counsel, and death penalty outcomes.  In 
light of this finding, can it be concluded that the American theories of litigant resources 
                                                 
23 Relatedly, Helmke’s (2002) research on the Argentine Supreme Court provides evidence that courts in 
authoritarian systems function differently than those in democratic systems.  She posits a theory of 
“strategic defection,” whereby the Court, motivated by its lack of independence from the dictatorship, will 
attempt to distance itself from a failing regime—or when faced by “institutional insecurity”—by 
consistently ruling against it throughout its demise (300). 
24 This assumption is based on the findings of Haynie (1994; 1995) who discovered that the Philippine 
Supreme Court, a Court also embedded within an authoritarian system, was less likely to defer to the 
regime and more likely to find in favor of the “underdog.” One possibility raised is that the Court was 
concerned with the perception of its legitimacy and was willing to assert its independence from the regime 
in order to enhance its perceived legitimacy. 
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are not applicable to the South African legal system?  This study suggests that perhaps 
they are not, or at least not in terms of appointed counsel.   
Yet the failure to determine the role of litigant resources may be indicative of a 
much larger theoretical concern.  Theoretically, it may be that some pro deo advocates 
are consistently appointed as counsel in death penalty cases before the Court, thus 
enabling them to overcome their purported “one-shotter” status within the legal 
profession and, concomitantly, achieve “repeat player” status within the context of the 
Court.  The implication of this argument is that the effect of litigant resources derived 
from either pro deo or non-appointed counsel in the Court’s decisions would have been 
equalized, thus resulting in the lack of significant differences among the case outcomes.  
To test this possibility, however, future research should include a more systematic 
analysis of the individual advocates participating in each case. 
Furthermore, the victim and defendant characteristics did not seem to play a 
significant role within the judicial decision-making process of the Appellate Division.  
Unlike the American context, no effects of either the defendants’ gender or the status of 
the victim were evident overall within the Court’s decisions.  However, these results must 
be tempered for several reasons. 
First, it is difficult to ascertain the degree to which victim characteristics matter 
within the sentencing process, given the available data required to test these effects.  
Studies of the American courts have successfully demonstrated the significant influences 
of victim characteristics through the use of additional measures such as age, race and 
income.  Others have even measured the effects of victim characteristics coupled with 
defendant characteristics (e.g., Haynie and Dover 1992).  Yet similar types of 
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examinations are not feasible within the context of South Africa, because these data are 
not consistently provided within the Appellate Division’s decisions.  Therefore, future 
research should attempt to incorporate additional information likely to be included in the 
decisions of the lower or trial courts. 
Similar concerns arise with respect to the defendants’ gender.  Methodologically, 
it may be that there is not sufficient variation among the cases to accurately test the 
relationship between gender and death penalty sentencing.  On the other hand, it may be 
that females are, at least theoretically, less violent than males and thus less likely to 
commit acts that warrant the death penalty. Therefore, it may be methodologically 
impossible or perhaps even theoretically irrelevant to test the effects of gender on the 
death penalty sentencing in South Africa.  Nevertheless, future research should attempt to 
focus on an issue area of law that may be more conducive to capturing the effects of 
gender within the sentencing process. 
A final hypothesis tested was the source from which the leave to appeal to the 
Appellate Division was granted.  The type of appeal seems to be somewhat related to 
cases involving murder with extenuating circumstances, since it appears that the Court 
was more willing overturn the sentence of death when it granted the leave to appeal.  This 
may have occurred because these types of cases included a clear basis for which the 
reversal could be justified—extenuating circumstances—in contrast to cases deemed 
more difficult to overturn, i.e., those where the death penalty was statutorily mandated. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The purpose of this study has been to examine the impact of political influences 
within the judicial decision-making process of South Africa’s highest court, the Appellate 
Division.  In order to accomplish this goal, several theories of judicial behavior 
developed within the American context have been extrapolated to and tested within the 
legal system of South Africa.   Consequently, the results have yielded several interesting 
findings regarding the role of the law and politics within this comparative framework. 
What can be concluded then about judicial decision making in South Africa’s 
Appellate Division and, further, about our theoretical understanding of judicial behavior?  
First, while this study certainly does not depict the full account upon which the Appellate 
Division based its decisions, it does provide a preliminary insight into the functioning of 
judicial decision making within South Africa’s formerly authoritarian regime.  The 
findings reveal that the Appellate Division’s sentencing process was certainly susceptible 
to extralegal factors or, more broadly, the politics that have been similarly found to exist 
within the U.S. legal system.  Yet the findings also reveal that judicial decision making 
within South Africa is constrained to some extent by the institutional constraints of the 
law.   
Finally, this study suggests that the U.S. legal system is not simply an anomaly 
within a larger comparative context and that theories derived from studies of the U.S. 
courts can be exported and applied to other court systems as well.  Yet it is only through 
the continual exportation of these theories to broader comparative frameworks that 
scholars can begin to fully generalize about judicial behavior. 
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Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean Standard Deviation 
MURDER 220 0 1 0.314 0.465 
MURDEXT 220 0 1 0.577 0.495 
OTHER 220 0 1 0.109 0.313 
PANLIB 220 0.29 0.79 0.424 0.086 
DEFRACE 217 0 1 0.073 0.440 
GENDER 219 0 1 0.980 0.130 
VICFEML 220 0 1 0.390 0.490 
VICMALE 220 0 1 0.520 0.500 
PRODEO 220 0 1 0.700 0.460 
TRIAL 220 0 1 0.659 0.475 
ADGRANT 220 0 1 0.236 0.426 
Valid N 
(listwise) 216  
 




Variable Frequency Percent 
No Extenuating 
Circumstances 69 68.6 
Otherwise 151 31.4 
MURDER 
 
System Missing 0 0 
Total 220 100 
Extenuating 
Circumstances 127 42.3 
Otherwise 93 57.7 
MURDEXT 
 
System Missing 0 0 
Total 220 100 
Other Serious 
Crimes 24 89.1 
Otherwise 196 10.9 
OTHER 
 
System Missing 0 0 
Total 220 100 
White 58 26.4 
Non-White 159 72.3 
 
DEFRACE 
System Missing 3 1.4 
Total 220 100 
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Variable Frequency Percent 
Male 215 97.7 
Female 4 1.8 
GENDER 
 
System Missing 1 0.5 
Total 220 100.0 
Female or Child 85 38.6 
Otherwise (male or 
missing) 135 61.4 
VICFEMAL 
 
System Missing 0 0 
Total 220 100 
Male 115 52.3 
Otherwise (female, 
child or missing) 105 47.7 
VICMALE 
 
System Missing 0 0 
Total 220 100 
Pro Deo Counsel 154 70.0 
Private Counsel 66 30.0 
PRODEO 
 
System Missing 0 0 
Total 220 100 
Trial Court Grants 
Leave 145 34.1 
Otherwise (A.D. 
Grant or missing) 75 65.9 
TRIGRANT 
 
System Missing 0 0 
Total 220 100 
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Variable Frequency Percent 
A.D. Grants Leave 52 23.6 
Otherwise (Trial 
Court Grant or 
missing) 
168 76.4 ADGRANT  
System Missing 0 0 
Total 220 100 
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APPENDIX C 
 
LIST OF ALL DEATH PENALTY DECISIONS, 1950-1990 
 
CITATION     DATE  
Year, Volume, Page    Year, Month & Date 
(e.g., 5810616 = 1958, Volume 1, p. 616) (e.g., June 19, 1950 = 500619) 
 
5810616     500619 
6040723     500815 
5130028     510518 
5130158     510521 
5310382     521212 
5330303     530528 
5340523     531003 
5340552     531003 
5410370     531211 
5410455     531211 
5420320     540308 
5520152     550302 
5530274     550516 
5530284     550524 
5540196     550822 
5630411     560611 
5710399     561111 
5710458     561213 
5720223     570304 
5730772     570726 
5740265     570912 
5740642     570927 
5740727     571230 
5820273     580310 
5830102     580512 
5830107     580508 
5840353     580924 
5840461     581002 
5840471     580930 
5910894     581202 
5920227     590309 
5920322     590302 
5920352     590324 
5920448     590326 
5930376     590612 
5940483     590924 
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CITATION     DATE  
Year, Volume, Page    Year, Month & Date 
(e.g., 5810616 = 1958, Volume 1, p. 616) (e.g., June 19, 1950 = 500619) 
 
6010752     591217 
6030535     600530 
6040776     600930 
6110460     601206 
6120209     601202 
6210312     611120 
6220380     620305 
6240533     620910 
6310692     620827 
6330188     630328 
6330631     630527 
6340856     630923 
6340877     630926 
6420783     631206 
6510082     640929 
6510209     641001 
6510215     641001 
6610831     641108 
6520340     650301 
6540688     650602 
6540692     650930 
6610507     651215 
6620297     660304 
6620433     660324 
6630140     660512 
6710387     661125 
6710435     661125 
6710440     661124 
6740566     670930 
6810495     671204 
6810545     671201 
6810666     671208 
6820576     680308 
6830250     680521 
6840708     681001 
6910561     681203 
6920637     681121 
6920632     690331 
6940085     690711 
6940421     690923 
7010430     691125 
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CITATION     DATE  
Year, Volume, Page    Year, Month & Date 
(e.g., 5810616 = 1958, Volume 1, p. 616) (e.g., June 19, 1950 = 500619) 
 
7020654     700326 
7030476     700518 
7030529     700518 
7110798     701214 
7130769     710527 
7140646     710921 
7220839     720321 
7220898     720316 
7230331     720404 
7230611     720601 
7240551     720828 
7310148     721002 
7310796     721111 
7440204     740401 
7440732     740917 
7530208     750326 
7540553     750723 
7540564     750722 
7540567     750722 
7610496     750724 
7620580     760309 
7620587     760304 
7630644     760525 
7640721     760903 
7710754     761208 
7720348     761123 
7730510     770516 
7730807     770601 
7740240     770823 
7810523     771114 
7820069     771129 
7930308     770330 
7820410     780223 
7820424     780227 
7820607     780316 
7820891     780321 
7830767     780602 
7840075     780511 
7840560     780818 
7840684     780831 
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CITATION     DATE  
Year, Volume, Page    Year, Month & Date 
(e.g., 5810616 = 1958, Volume 1, p. 616) (e.g., June 19, 1950 = 500619) 
 
7910461     780929 
7910478     781106 
7920656     780330 
7920933     781201 
7920938     790302 
7930047     790320 
8010001     791001 
8010149     790827 
8010938     791203 
8020741     800228 
8030745     800519 
8030755     800516 
8030824     800602 
8030825     800602 
8030829     800530 
8030860     800523 
8040559     800903 
8040604     800911 
8040613     800911 
8110056     800923 
8110959     801130 
8120738     800602 
8120744     800829 
8130011     810316 
8130172     810319 
8130204     810324 
8130353     810331 
8130377     810331 
8140614     810524 
8140851     810831 
8210030     810910 
8210036     810908 
8230113     820407 
8230678     820308 
8240736     820831 
8240744     820827 
8330275     830331 
8330532     830519 
8330610     830530 
8330662     830530 
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CITATION     DATE  
Year, Volume, Page    Year, Month & Date 
(e.g., 5810616 = 1958, Volume 1, p. 616) (e.g., June 19, 1950 = 500619) 
 
8330717     830530 
8410091     830929 
8410556     831117 
8410583     831117 
8420868     840322 
8430524     840511 
8430666     840525 
8440629     840903 
8510001     840925 
8510009     840925 
8510236     840928 
8510625     841129 
8510805     841130 
8520806     850307 
8530029     850326 
8530222     850328 
8530881     850529 
8530908     850530 
8540767     850916 
8630196     860326 
8640734     860828 
8641188     860930 
8720307     861128 
8720620     860313 
8720663     870312 
8730014     870326 
8730097     870331 
8730490     870527 
8730717     870521 
8740351     870525 
8810037     870922 
8810120     870922 
8810868     871201 
8820151     871126 
8820485     870825 
8820779     880311 
8830190     880329 
8830926     880525 
8840005     880329 
8840010     880330 
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CITATION     DATE  
Year, Volume, Page    Year, Month & Date 
(e.g., 5810616 = 1958, Volume 1, p. 616) (e.g., June 19, 1950 = 500619) 
 
8910268     880930 
8910669     880527 
8910687     880930 
8910821     881123 
8910939     881125 
8920022     881117 
8920043     881124 
8920096     881122 
8930420     881129 
8920863     890321 
8930695     890601 
8930712     890524 
8930720     890529 
8940356     890530 
8941013     890905 
9010032     890918 
9010832     891130 
9030185     900326 
9040709     900913 
9040727     900917 
9040735     900918 
9110169     900928 
9110517     901116 
9120093     901130 
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